

# **Smaller Companies**

The long-term opportunity



**June 2015**

This document is intended for institutional investors and investment professionals only and should not be distributed to or relied upon by retail clients.

# Introduction


Over the longer term, smaller company returns have outstripped those of their large-cap peers - a phenomenon known as the 'smaller company paradox'. Traditional academic theory suggests that abnormal returns are fleeting, arbitrated away by investors seeking to exploit the anomaly. However, various factors suggest that the asset class could continue to generate premium risk-adjusted returns over the long term.

In this paper, we examine the reasons for these outsized returns and outline why the factors behind this 'paradox' are structural and likely to persist for some considerable time. Supported by long-term, structural tailwinds and with a proven track record of delivering strong risk-adjusted returns above those of larger-cap peers over time, smaller companies may deserve a higher allocation in investor portfolios.

# The smaller company paradox

The first 10 years of the millennium were frequently described as a 'lost decade' for equities. Global stock markets generally have since strengthened considerably. However, long-term returns from large-cap and small-cap equities have diverged starkly. Indeed, between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2014, global large-cap equities delivered an 81.1% total return. In contrast, total returns from global smaller companies have been dramatically stronger, standing at 332.2% (Chart 1).

Chart 1: Small and large-cap global performance



History shows that once investors come to recognise that a performance anomaly exists, they have sought to tap into it very quickly. As professors Dimson and Marsh of the London Business School have identified<sup>1</sup>, this has meant that any 'stock market anomaly' is likely to prove not only short-lived, but may even reverse comparatively soon after it is discovered.

Investors normally gravitate towards sectors whose returns have historically been highest. Why then, despite their consistently strong returns and outperformance, is the smaller companies sector still systematically underappreciated? We outline in later sections our views on why this anomaly persists, as well as why we believe that smaller companies will remain underappreciated for many years to come. There are powerful forces at work in the world of investing that tend to steer investors towards the largest companies and away from smaller stocks. These forces ensure that the undervaluation of smaller companies

is not fully arbitrated away, allowing steady outperformance over time.

Smaller company investing certainly entails additional considerations, such as liquidity and risk, over and above mainstream equity investing. The sheer number of companies involved also makes investing in global smaller companies a particular challenge. This places a premium on a workable and reliable investment process that – above all – has the potential to deliver consistently strong returns in the medium and longer term.

As investors become increasingly global in their outlook, the MSCI All-Country World Index has grown in prominence as the global equity benchmark. However, this index excludes smaller companies. Based on MSCI definitions, smaller companies represent as much as 10% of the combined investable universe. This means that many of those investing in global equities have bypassed the returns available from smaller companies.

**"There are powerful forces at work in the world of investing that tend to steer investors towards the largest companies and away from smaller stocks"**

<sup>1</sup>Source: 'Numis Smaller Companies Index – 2015 Annual Review,' Elroy Dimson and Paul Marsh, 15 January 2015

# The historical evidence


Numerous studies reviewing smaller company returns in different geographic markets have been published. This research covers, on average, 40 years and in most cases shows that smaller companies deliver a premium return to their larger counterparts.

Rolf Banz in his University of Chicago doctoral thesis, later published in the Journal of Financial Economics<sup>2</sup>, first identified and computed the ‘size effect’ for US stocks. In analysing US common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, he discovered that, on average, smaller companies enjoyed higher risk-adjusted returns than larger peers. In addition, his research found

that this ‘size effect’ was long term in nature and had persisted for over 40 years.

In their research contained in the ‘Numis Smaller Companies Index – 2015 Annual Review,’ Dimson, Marsh and Staunton provide a comprehensive compendium of research on the ‘Smaller Companies Effect’. Some of their key findings about the premium returns generated by small-cap stocks are presented in Chart 2. They find that this premium amounts to 5.9% per annum (p.a.) on a global basis over the 2000–2014 period. If compounded, this figure would clearly amount to substantial outperformance.

**Chart 2: Global small-cap premia from 2000-2014**




**“This research... shows that smaller companies deliver a premium return to their larger counterparts”**

<sup>2</sup>Source: ‘The relationship between return and market value of common stocks’, Rolf W Banz (published in the Journal of Financial Economics, 1980)


Charts 3 and 4 also depict the evidence in the US and UK markets. For both, smaller companies have outperformed their larger-cap peers over the long term.

**Chart 3: US evidence**



Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Sourcebook 2013, based on total returns data from Morningstar (Ibbotson).

**Chart 4: UK evidence**



Elroy Dimson and Paul Marsh, Numis Smaller Companies Index, 2013 Annual Review, based on total returns for the Numis Smaller Companies indices and the FTSE All-Share Index

# An under-researched sector

The economics of investment banking dictate that equity research analysts generally cover the largest companies. These typically enjoy larger free floats and greater liquidity (as well as deeper pockets when it comes to paying fees to investment banks for raising finance and corporate advice). Consequently, it makes economic sense for some analysts and banks to restrict themselves to covering a small number of very large companies. Vodafone and Exxon, for example, have 38 and 30 individual analysts respectively covering their activities<sup>3</sup>. It is not unknown for the analysts at ‘bulge-bracket’ investment banks to work full-time on only two or three companies. Hundreds and hundreds of pages of research about these companies are published on a regular basis. This suggests that

everything that could possibly be known about each of these companies is already known.

Things are very different when it comes to smaller companies. While the businesses themselves may be less complex, there is undoubtedly less research available about them. Moreover, the research that is available is often much shallower. This information gap opens up opportunities to find compelling investment ideas that others have yet to discover. Investment managers often neglect illiquid or ‘hard-to-buy’ shares, which may have restricted free floats. This may be for sound reasons, such as concerns over fund outflows dictating forced sales. However, it may be that some investment managers have shorter investment horizons and feel it is incumbent on them to trade aggressively.

**Chart 5: European research coverage: large & small caps**



“This information gap opens up opportunities to find compelling investment ideas that others have yet to discover”

<sup>3</sup>Source: Bloomberg, 2 February 2015

# An out-of-favour sector . . . and why this will remain the case

There are two key factors that suggest smaller companies will remain underappreciated in the longer term and mean that the sector should continue to reward those investors who choose to seek it out. Both reinforce the ‘smaller companies paradox’.

## Institutional investor behaviour

As a whole, institutional investors follow the advice of the investment consultants that help them to design and validate their long-term investment strategies. Their world view tends not to break out smaller companies as an asset class from the wider ‘equities’ category. Smaller companies Requests for Proposals (RFPs) are extremely rare. This important and influential group of advisers systematically overlooks an area with strong excess return potential.

## The rise of passives

Bogle launched the First American Investment Trust in 1975 as the first index tracker. The first Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) started in the US in 1993. These two strategies now represent a meaningful proportion of the global stock market. Their rise was most marked in the 1990s, just when smaller companies were in the doldrums. A recent working paper by Cremers, Martijn et al<sup>4</sup> indicates that indexing (including closet indexing) represents about 40% of UK and US mutual fund assets. Separate analysis by Lipper<sup>5</sup> corroborates this trend. According to its analysis, passively

managed assets have increased from 4% in 2003 to 12% in 2013 in Europe, while in the US, passive assets under management increased from 11% in 2003 to 25% in 2013.

Passive equity funds lend themselves better to large-caps since they work best when the underlying shares are deep and liquid. ETFs, in turn, can be of the synthetic variety, meaning that the fund vehicle uses derivatives to mimic and replicate the asset or index being tracked. In addition, the availability of options and other derivatives for large-cap companies has combined with the rapid rise of algorithmic trading to speed up the volume of activity at the large end of the market significantly. Due to the sheer number of stocks involved and much lower levels of dealing activity, smaller companies markets are notoriously difficult to track passively. Very few small-cap passive funds are available, while derivatives are similarly hard to find in the small-cap world and are thinly traded.

Combined, these factors contribute to the ongoing systematic neglect of the smaller companies sector, despite the strong returns it can offer.

**“This important and influential group of advisers systematically overlooks an area with strong excess return potential”**

<sup>4</sup>Source: ‘The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide: Explicit and Closet Indexing, Fees and Performance,’ Cremers, Martijn, Miguel Ferreira, Pedro Matos and Laura Starks, 13 February 2013

<sup>5</sup>Source: Lipper, Thomson Reuters, ‘European Fund Market Mid-Year Review 2013’

# Risk and risk-adjusted returns

## Low risk outperforms

A number of the basic premises behind the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model have been questioned in recent years. One of these is the relationship between ‘risk’ and ‘return’. Professors Dimson and Marsh looked specifically at idiosyncratic risk (sometimes known as non-market risk, diversifiable risk or stock-specific risk). Their research focused on the Numis Smaller Companies Index (ex-Investment Trusts) between 1979 and 2012. This showed that the lower-risk cohort, or group, produced 5.4% p.a. higher returns than the higher-risk cohort. Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang<sup>6</sup> also demonstrated that in many markets and over long periods, stocks with higher specific risk have tended to underperform. Indeed, this is the experience of the Standard Life Investments smaller companies team. Consequently, great care is taken when constructing portfolios.


Since the millennium, some of the largest and most stable companies in the world from a variety of sectors have either imploded or declined precipitously in value. Scale, size and international reach do not necessarily equate to low risk, as investors in RBS, Tesco, Wm. Morrison, BP, or Nokia are likely to know only too

well. Consequently, the risk differential between the largest and smaller companies may not be as great as might be assumed, particularly given that these larger-cap companies tend to feature among the largest constituents of market indices and consequently account for a significant proportion of their market capitalisation. The UK stock market is a good example of this concentration risk. Three sectors – financials, consumer goods and oil & gas – account for over 54% of the FTSE All-Share Index market capitalisation<sup>7</sup>.

## Small-caps outperform on a risk-adjusted basis

While lower-risk smaller companies have been shown to outperform higher-risk small-caps, the asset class as a whole also outperforms on a risk-adjusted basis. Our analysis of risk-adjusted returns over the period January 2001 to the end of December 2014 revealed that smaller company returns outstrip their large-cap peers worldwide, except perhaps for the Pacific ex-Japan region. In other words, small-caps generate higher returns per unit of risk assumed. Chart 6 depicts this sustained long-term phenomenon – strong evidence that the smaller companies paradox endures and that allocations to smaller companies can be a source of significant alpha (a measure of excess return) generation.

Chart 6: Risk-adjusted returns across the world, comparing large and small



“Small-caps generate higher returns per unit of risk assumed”

<sup>6</sup>Source: ‘High idiosyncratic volatility and low returns: International and further US evidence,’ Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (Journal of Financial Economics, 2009)

<sup>7</sup>Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon, 26 May 2015

# Selecting smaller companies for investment

Analysing aggregate market or asset class metrics is instructive up to a point. However, as bottom-up stock pickers, the team here at Standard Life Investments invests in individual companies, not indices or sector averages. It is often wrong to generalise about any asset class, as growth and high-return potential can invariably still be found whatever appears to be happening at the headline market or asset class levels. Indeed, the small-cap universe is large, with the MSCI AC World Small-Cap Index alone comprising over 6,000 companies, placing a premium on manager resources and investment process. This requires an approach that looks at the entire investment universe in a consistent way to unearth high-potential opportunities and to target repeatability of performance.

Smaller companies increasingly lend themselves to this approach. Some may view ‘globalisation’ as a hackneyed expression nowadays, but greater globalisation has meant that global smaller company investing can now be conducted in a much more systematic and process-driven way. Convergence is taking place in all aspects of business and investment. The internet and modern communications mean that an investment manager based in Edinburgh can reach out to senior managers of smaller companies across the globe. Companies offer English language investor websites, containing company presentations and research. Investors and companies are all pursuing similar goals and national market idiosyncrasies are becoming less apparent. Slowly, accounting standards and corporate governance attitudes are converging. Investment banks around the world are assisting with international corporate access and research.

**“The small-cap universe is large, placing a premium on manager resources and investment process”**

At Standard Life Investments, our long-standing smaller company investment process emphasises predictability, visibility, quality and stability, alongside positive earnings and business momentum. Portfolios are relatively concentrated at around 50 stocks – sufficient to gain important diversification benefits, while also allowing managers to take high-conviction positions in favoured stocks. In what is a large universe, proprietary screening tools, focusing on key corporate attributes that are proven lead indicators of share price performance, are critical in helping to focus research effort and to provide a shortlist of investable stocks for further analysis. Meetings with senior company management are particularly essential for gauging the sustainability of individual businesses’ growth and for reducing downside risk. Rigorous peer review also fully tests conviction in the company’s prospects before stocks are selected for portfolios. We also collaborate with our colleagues covering different regions and asset classes to corroborate and test our thinking, and to increase our conviction in our investment decision making.

Smaller companies clearly offer significant investment attractions. However, their size and breadth of investment opportunities present major challenges for all but the most skilled and well-resourced managers. A well-defined and consistent process for exploiting the returns smaller companies can offer is clearly a must if investors wish to outperform in the long term.

# Conclusion

Over the long run, research shows that investing in smaller companies has resulted in premium returns compared with those achieved by large-caps. That they have done so on a risk-adjusted basis is testament to their alpha-generation potential and is clear validation of the smaller company paradox.

The factors behind this paradox appear to be structural in nature. Concern on the part of some investors at least regarding liquidity and apparent risk is unlikely to dissipate soon. Meanwhile,

the economics of investment banking and the sheer effort required to conduct proper small-cap due diligence are likely to ensure that research coverage and external scrutiny remain poor. Combined with other market developments, such as the rise of passive investment approaches and entrenched behavioural attitudes on the part of advisors and consultants, this suggests the sector is likely to remain overlooked. Ultimately, then, this paradox should continue to provide those investors deploying a robust and consistent stock selection process with attractive long-term returns.

**"Over the long run, research shows that investing in smaller companies has resulted in premium returns compared with those achieved by large-caps"**

# About the author



**Harry Nimmo**  
Investment Director,  
Head of Smaller Companies

Harry is Head of Smaller Companies Equities at Standard Life Investments. Harry joined the company in 1985 and has managed the UK Smaller Companies OEIC since its inception in 1997, in addition to managing the UK Smaller Companies Investment Trust mandate since 2003.

Building on this success, the European Smaller Companies SICAV, managed by Andrew Paisley, was launched in 2007. This was followed by the Global Smaller Companies OEIC, which Harry co-manages with Alan Rowsell, in January 2012.

Harry has won numerous awards during the course of his career. In September 2012, he was awarded an 'Outstanding Investor' accolade from Morningstar OBSR in recognition of exceptional results over at least ten years.

## Acknowledgements

Harry gratefully acknowledges the work of Elroy Dimson and Paul Marsh, Emeritus Professors of Finance at London Business School. Their publications include the annual Credit Suisse Investment Returns year book and source book and *Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns*. Together, they designed the Numis Smaller Companies Index (previously the RBS Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index).

For more information visit our website [standardlifeinvestments.com](http://standardlifeinvestments.com).

**Visit us online**



[standardlifeinvestments.com](http://standardlifeinvestments.com)

## Important Information

This material is not intended as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, and it is not provided as sales or advertising communication and does not constitute investment advice.

Products and services described herein are provided by Standard Life Investments, its subsidiaries, affiliates or related companies. An investment in any strategy is speculative and involves certain risks. Prospective investors should ensure that they: (1) understand the nature of the investment and the extent of their exposure to risk; (2) have sufficient knowledge, experience and access to professional advisors to make their own legal, tax, accounting, and financial evaluation of the merits and risks of participating in an investment in the strategy; and (3) consider the suitability of investing in light of their own circumstances and financial condition. The strategy's investment program is not suitable as the sole investment vehicle for an investor and should be part of an overall investment strategy. Investors should only invest if total off of the investment may be sustained.

Equity securities are generally subject to varying degrees of market factors, including but not limited to, market sector, market liquidity, issuer and investment style risks.

Due to among other things, the volatile nature of the markets and the investment strategies discussed herein, they may only be suitable for certain investors. No investment strategy or risk management technique can guarantee return or eliminate risk in any market environment.

The above factors do not claim to be a complete list or explanation of the risks involved in an investment. In addition, as the investment markets and strategy develop and change over time, an investment may be subject to additional and different risk factors.

No assurance can be made that profits will be achieved or that substantial losses will not be incurred.

## Third party data services disclaimer

Any data contained herein which is attributed to a third party ("Third Party Data") is the property of (a) third party supplier(s) (the "Owner") and is licensed for use by Standard Life\*\*. Third Party Data may not be copied or distributed. Third Party Data is provided "as is" and is not warranted to be accurate, complete or timely. To the extent permitted by applicable law, none of the Owner, Standard Life\*\* or any other third party (including any third party involved in providing and/or compiling Third Party Data) shall have any liability for Third Party Data or for any use made of Third Party Data. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Neither the Owner nor any other third party sponsors, endorses or promotes the fund or product to which Third Party Data relates.

\*\*Standard Life means the relevant member of the Standard Life group, being Standard Life plc together with its subsidiaries, subsidiary undertakings and associated companies (whether direct or indirect) from time to time."

Standard Life Investments Limited is registered in Scotland (SC123321) at 1 George Street, Edinburgh EH2 2LL. Standard Life Investments Limited is authorised and regulated in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority.

Standard Life Investments (Hong Kong) Limited is licensed with and regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Life Investments Limited.

Standard Life Investments Limited (ABN 36 142 665 227) is incorporated in Scotland (No. SC123321) and is exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence under paragraph 911A(2)(l) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the 'Act') in respect of the provision of financial services as defined in Schedule A of the relief instrument no.10/0264 dated 9 April 2010 issued to Standard Life Investments Limited by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. These financial services are provided only to wholesale clients as defined in subsection 761G(7) of the Act. Standard Life Investments Limited is authorised and regulated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Conduct Authority under the laws of the United Kingdom, which differ from Australian laws.

Standard Life Investments Limited, a company registered in Ireland (904256) 90 St Stephen's Green Dublin 2 and is authorised and regulated in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority. Standard Life Investments (USA) Limited and Standard Life Investments (Corporate Funds) Limited are both registered as an Investment Adviser with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

Calls may be monitored and/or recorded to protect both you and us and help with our training. [www.standardlifeinvestments.com](http://www.standardlifeinvestments.com)

© 2015 Standard Life, images reproduced under licence